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Pity the poor much-maligned administrators of EEC
food aid. Every year the Community spends over ECU
700 mn on food aid, and every year - or so it seems
- another report which calls in question major
aspects of their work is issued. At least this has been
the case since 1977 when the first of four major official
reports was published.2 In 1980 a document prepared
for the Committee on Development and Cooperation
of the European Parliament described EEC food aid
as:
. an inefficient way of distributing European
surplus production to the poor countries, associated
with high costs, countless mishaps, delays,
wrangling over responsibility and bureaucratic
obstacles; there is scarcely any control over how it
works and what effects it achieves. . Any attempt
to hold it up to scrutiny leads to a radically
different suggestion: confine food aid to emergency
aid and otherwise replace it with financial
asssistance. [Focke 1981:56]
Those are probably the most common-sense words
ever written about EEC food aid. Sadly, common-
sense is the last thing one has come to expect where
food aid is concerned.
The latest report, requested by the Commission of the
European Communities and carried out by the Africa
Bureau Cologne in association with the Institute of
Development Studies at Sussex University, states
categorically that it considers food aid for sudden
emergencies to be beyond the scope of the EEC 'since
deliveries are either too late or too expensive, or both'
[Africa Bureau/IDS 1982:5.4] Thus, when food aid
may urgently be needed the Community cannot
respond.
Non-emergency food aid from the EEC fares little
better in the report. Community food aid is described
J would like to thank John Forsyth, Lindsey Husum and Nicki
Sissons for their illuminating comments and criticisms received while
I worked on this article. Any improvements are due to them: de-
ficiencies in and responsibility for the content are mine alone.
Amanda Milligan kindly helped proof-read.
2The reports are: ISMOG [1977]; European Communities Court of
Auditors [1980]; IDS/CEAS [1981]; and Africa Bureau/IDS [1982].
Bulletin, 1983, vol 14 no 2, Institute of Development Studies, Sussex
as 'relatively insignificant' (p 2.6) and 'a marginal
resource' (p3.18) - even at ECU 700 mn a year of
taxpayers' money! Yet more damningly, two-thirds of
it, in cash terms, consists of dairy aid, about which
(Operation Flood in India aside) the authors are quite
dismissive.
The report brings together the elements of a powerful
general case against dairy aid. The cost of EEC food
aid study [IDS/CEAS 1981] had already found dairy
products to be 'particularly cost ineffective' as a
resource transfer (p 2.4); the report now adds that
dairy aid 'arguably benefits the better-off consumer,
particularly in the towns' (p 2.20), and that it cannot
be said to facilitate additional development by saving
foreign exchange unless the recipient country is
already an importer of similar products (p 2.16). The
majority are not: in any case most dairy aid is used for
supplementary feeding or food for work projects,
where it has been criticised for difficulty in handling
and for creating undesirable food habits, or worse.3
Moreover inadequate calorie intake is now recognised
as a more serious problem than protein supply
(p 2.16), a sufficient reason in itself for questioning the
distribution of dried skimmed milk. In other words,
about half the EEC food aid programme (dairy aid
except that going to India), broadly speaking, simply
provides the wrong food. That happens before real
questions about the contribution of food aid to
development have been asked. The report calls for
dairy aid to be reduced and cereals and cash to be
provided instead.
One of the main claims about EEC food aid has always
been that it provides balance of payments support.
The study suggests however that it has in fact not been
'particularly successful at providing relief for
structural balance of payments deficits: less than a
quarter of the total value of the programme can be
credited with this effect' (p3.18). Another long-
established myth exposed!
What about the programme in more general terms?
The report is witheringly candid about its many
3For general problems with supplementary feeding and tood for work,
see Jackson [1982]. The bibliography on p 128-30 also lists other
articles and documents which discuss problems with project food
aid.
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drawbacks. Ten countries were visited in the course of
the evaluation and on the question of administration
all the country reports are 'unanimous in their view
that the present structure and mode of operation of the
Community food aid programme make it quite
incapable of functioning effectively in the field of long-
term development assistance' (p IX). Another section
notes that 'the food aid programme the Community
needs is not the one it presently has . . .' (p 5.6) and its
chapter on recommendations for improvement urges a
'far-reaching revision of the Community food aid
programme', which must be achieved 'not by
downgrading the rhetoric (about the programme) but
by upgrading the reality' (p 5.20).
Among the fundamental changes called for, two stand
out. The first is that 'to provide general support for a
policy oriented towards sustainable growth, better
satisfaction of basic needs and food security in
recipient countries, food aid is best sold on the open
market' (p VII). The second is to link food aid with
national food strategies.
The recommendation to place emphasis on the sale of
food aid, rather than its free distribution, is important.
In 1981 over 50 per cent of EEC food went for free
distribution, often in food for work and nutritional
projects. The report is unenthusiastic about the value
of such projects, noting that they 'should be
approached with great caution' (p5.19). Some food
for work projects were judged to be successful,
particularly one supported by the World Food
Programme in Ethiopia, but the evaluation stresses
that there was little time in any of the countries visited
to investigate the costs and benefits of the projects in
detail. The impression is given that reports on project
food aid were compiled mainly after discussions with
food aid administrators rather than in-depth site
visits. This gives reason for even greater caution.
The report also suggests that consideration should be
given to paying workers on public works schemes in
cash rather than food, using counterpart funds from
the sale of food aid where appropriate. This would
make a lot more sense: even in apparently food-short
countries such as Haiti and Bangladesh, workers
regularly sell a good proportion of their food because
they need money: they are poorer than they are
hungry. Other recent articles and books have been
even more critical of project food aid than this, so the
recommendation, as far as it goes, is welcome (see
footnote 3).
Sale should at least ensure more accountability than
the free distribution system and the resulting funds, in
theory, could be used to pay for needed community
works. To judge from experience, however, problems
would still remain: governments will simply continue
54
as at present and keep no serious counterpart fund
accounts: naturally they would much rather use the
money as they see fit, usually not to help the rural
poor, politically the least powerful group in most
countries. As the European Communities' Court of
Auditors observed [1980], reports on the use of
counterpart funds in most countries visited 'either did
not exist or were merely token' (p 105).
The new evaluation understands that point and
suggests that counterpart funding should not be over-
emphasized; instead the overall food strategies of each
country should be examined and food aid integrated
into them. This is the second important recom-
mendation. On paper it sounds fine but in reality 'the
evaluation has found that food policy in recipient
countries is insufficiently developed in many cases to
prevent the occurrence of a disincentive effect, either
in price terms or more generally in terms of
government neglect of the agricultural sector' (p 5.2).
The evaluation puts the point more clearly elsewhere:
'...many of the country studies drew an association
between the availability of food aid and the existence
of unsatisfactory policies. This is not to say that the
food aid caused the unsatisfactory policies, but the
existence of a strong association is at least a cause for
concern' (p 3.6). It certainly is! In my opinion, until
donors become serious and begin asking the right
questions, Third World governments will continue to
accept food aid and to neglect their own agriculture.
On agricultural policy it is important for policy
makers in donor countries to ask some basic questions
before giving food aid. Two questions that need
answers are:
what are the pricing and taxing policies in the
recipient country?
What percentage of its budget does the government
allocate to agriculture?
In one country after another, especially in sub-
Saharan Africa, the price peasant farmers receive for
basic grains is so low as to constitute a major
disincentive to production. The Court of Auditors'
Report states this clearly, saying that among the
reasons hindering the reduction of food deficits is:
in many cases. . . a policy of low farm prices;
this policy, intended to placate the urban
population which is more important politically,
discourages farmers from expanding food crops
beyond the needs of their own families. A policy of
this sort has resulted in one African country (a
traditional exporter of rice until 1971) having to
import 400,000 tonnes of rice in 1980 compared
with domestic production of 2 mn tonnes.
[European Communities Court of Auditors
1980:125]
Allied to low prices there is often a tax policy placing a
heavy burden on peasant producers. Small wonder
that they either grow little or else sell to traders who
smuggle grain out to countries where the price is
higher, thus depriving their own government of
income.
Many governments also devote minimal resources to
agricultural development, often as little as lOper cent
of their budgets, although the majority of their
populations work the land. In such cases it is useless,
indeed counter-productive, to send in food aid.
Perhaps these are the 'big issues' to which the
evaluation makes occasional reference, while saying
that it could not address them. But address them we
must if we are serious about helping the poor, rather
than sustaining a system which encourages poverty.
Even more disturbing is the amount of money devoted
to military expenditure by many governments. Again,
the evaluation notes this without ever coming to grips
with the logical consequences. Talking of 'fungibility'
the evaluation notes that a 'particular case in point
might be the association between high food aid
deliveries and high military expenditure' (p 2.6).
Unless I have missed further references, this appears to
be the one and only time in the main text where public
money spent on matters military is mentioned. Yet it
surely is crucial to any concept of aid to the poor. To
allude to it en passant is merely to avoid the issue.
Given the unsatisfactory state of EEC food aid, the
evaluators are reduced to making suggestions based
on potential: future theory rather than the past 14
years' practice of EEC food aid. Theoretically all
things are possible: the EEC could, as is suggested,
provide more cereal aid, cut right back on dairy
products, provide cash as well as food and increase the
number of administrators. In theory recipient
governments could incorporate food aid into sound
and attainable food strategies, and in theory it will
soon be just a hop, skip and a jump to Disneyland for
all the Third World's poor.
But in fact the same old problems will remain.
Governments faced with severe political problems of
their own will still pay little attention to their
agricultural policies (why should they when there are
so many countries with food to give them?). Donor
countries, especially the EEC, will still want to be seen
to be feeding the hungry when what they are mainly
doing is getting rid of surpluses caused by bizarre
pricing and subsidy policies; and food aid will
continue to be an excuse for policy makers everywhere
to avoid asking the hard questions about recipient
governments' own agricultural and social policies. If
the aim of EEC food aid is to help poor people, then
the most pragmatic solution is to cut the programme
down substantially, concentrate primarily on feeding
refugees and people affected by disasters, and above
all to get to grips with the 'big issues'.
This is an interesting report but one which represents,
as Dr Johnson said on another matter, no more than
the triumph of hope over experience.
For references see page 61.
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